The Process of Ethnohistory

In the course of this week’s readings, the common thread that I found pervasive in both works is that ethnohistory, both its occurence and subsequent study, involves a highly complex process.  While the contributors to Brian Axel’s From the Margins primarily discuss the processes inherent within ethnohistory itself, Russell Barber and Frances Berdan focus on the complex process of analyzing ethnohistory in The Emperor’s Mirror.  As such, ethnohistory and indeed the process of its scholarship seem to be a complex series of synchronic events, ultimately resulting in a diachronic phenomenon. 

The essays presented in From the Margins certainly present this notion of process in their analyses of historically specific cultures.  In his essay, Annals of the Archive Nicholas B. Dirks discusses the development of ethnography in India within the context of the ethnographic process of the archive.  For Dirks, the archive itself is an essential element of the ethnohistory of colonial India.  “The archive is a discursive formation in the totalizing sense that it reflects the categories and operations of the state itself.” (58)  This theme of process is further emphasized by Michel-Rolph Trouillot in his essay Culture on the Edges examining the creolization of African slaves in the Caribbean.  Though the creolization of these slaves took place in a historically specific setting, that of the Caribbean plantation system, its development is nonetheless a distinct process.  Trouillot explicitly states, “Creolization is a process rather than a totality.” (204)  These are only two of the examples presented in this volume which take place in historically specific settings (synchrony), yet occur as a diachronic process.

The Emperor’s Mirror seeks to explain the development, evolution, and purpose of ethnohistory; in short- its process.  As Barber and Berdan illustrate, the development of the discipline itself is a continuing process.  However, the focus of this week’s selection, and it seems the entirety of the work itself, is on the different processes ethnohistorians employ to study cultures.  Ultimately, the authors present a model they refer to as The Reality Mediation Model, which emphasizes a process of description, mediated by deconstruction.  The authors believe that deconstrution is capable of  “leaving a residue of description that has some basis in reality.” (44)  In Part 2 of their work they discuss the methods utilized in The Reality Mediation Model.  Acknowledging that reality is an impossibility in description, this model presents a process by which at least parts of reality may be viewed.  It seems to me that though perhaps overly optimistic, ethnohistorians must at least marginally subscribe to The Reality Mediation Model or a model similar to it.  I think its attempt at capturing a semblance of reality distinguishes ethnohistory from “ethnotheory” or “ethnophilosophy.”  Thoughts?

Objective Anthropology?

In the spirit of last week’s readings, I found that the authors for this week, while dealing with immensely theoretical material each sought a semblance of objectivity in ethnography and anthropology.  By attempting to interpret culture beyond a theoretical notion, each author contributes to an understanding of objective anthropology and ethnography.  In the realm of social history, this is incredibly valuable.

The study of human interactions, an inherently historically specific function at its core, is invariably transformed into a theoretical, trans-historical endeavor by the infinite and continual differences in individuals, and thus societies.  Similar to Postone’s critique of traditional Marxism, one must ground social theory in a historically specific context in order to apply it trans-historically.  Geertz, for instance, stresses the importance of studying behavior as social action. (Geertz; Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture; 10)  As Geertz argues, culture must be studied objectively by ascertaining what an action brings to a situation, or as he describes it, what the “import” is. (Geertz 10)  Quoting Ward Goodenough, Geertz identifies the most common means by which objectivity in anthropology is destroyed-the notion that “culture is located in the hearts and minds of men.” (Geertz 11)

Similarly, this week’s authors seem to if not directly (Sahlins and Geertz), indirectly subscribe to Mark Bevir’s method of comparison as a means by which to objectively ground theoretical material.  In Waiting for Foucault, Still, Marshall Sahlins directly states that, “No good ethnography is self-contained.  Implicitly or explicitly ethnography is an act of comparison.  By virtue of comparison ethnographic description becomes objective.” (Sahlins; Waiting for Foucault, Still; 12)  Moreover, in Other Times, Other Customs: The Anthropology of History, Sahlins explicitly declares that it is through the study of  a wide variety of cultural structures that our understandings of history are advanced.(Sahlins; Other Times, Other Cultures: The Anthropology of History; 534)  How else, if not through some method of comparison?

With culture an inherent component of any social history, anthropology and ethnography must be objectively grounded in order to be made useful for the historian.  While this is certainly a tall order, it appears that these authors have not abandoned hope.

Subjective Objectivity

Both Peter Novick and Mark Bevir examine the importance of objectivity in historical pursuit.  Novick, in That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession, as the title implies, explores objectivity within the specific framework of the development of the professionalization of historical scholarship in America.  Bevir, on the other hand, in his article Objectivity in History published in Volume 33, Issue 3 of History and Theory takes a far more general approach in assessing the possibility of objectivity in history.

Novick’s, That Noble Dream  can best be described as a history of the profession of history in America.  At the heart of the development of the profession however, is the question of objectivity.  Novick begins by tracing the roots of American historical pursuit, and thus the quest for objectivity, to that of Germany as exemplified by Leopold von Ranke.  Out of this admiration for a devotion to sources and the pursuit of historical truth developed a deep committment to the scientific method as the model by which to pursue historical fact.  Synonymous with the obsession for objective historical analysis was the movement towards the professionalized American historian.  At the heart of this relationship between objectivity and professionalization is according to Novick, the association of objective knowledge with authoritative knowledge. (51)  By embodying objectivity, American professional historians could begin to distinguish themselves from the ranks of the amateur.

In an ironic testament to the powerful influences of an individual’s personal experience upon their worldview, and thus the impossibility of complete objectivity in its truest sense, the development of World War I and the inter-war years prior to World War II challenged much of the profession’s emphasis on “disinterested objectivity.”  Large-scale events such as the Great War itself, the critique of capitalism, and the rise of the Nazi Party proved incredibly destructive to the doctrine of unbiased objectivity.  However, Novick argues that perhaps equally as destructive to objective historical pursuit, and thus the historical profession, were the domestic in-house problems facing historical professionals.  Strong anti-Semitism, lack of quality and quantity of scholarship, and powerful sectional divides during the inter-war years were equally as devastating.  Out of this decline in objectivity rose the acceptance of both skepticism, “denying that true knowledge is possible”, and relativism, “stressing the plurality of criteria of knowledge.” (167)  These rejections of objectivity, specifically relativism, championed by Charles Beard and Carl Becker, carried the American historical profession into World War II and the Cold War era.

Again, as a function of worldly experience, the fight against Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism greatly defused the strength of relativism within the historical profession.  Accompanying the “re-rise” of objectivity was significant progress in the professionalization of historical study.  This return to objectivity, paralleled by a strengthening of the profession reverted the guild back to the original purpose of professionalization: autonomy. 

While Novick examines objectivity as a function of American historical professionalization, Mark Bevir explores the possibility of objectivity in historical pursuit.  While many philosophers such as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Michael Foucault, and Jacques Derrida reject the notion of objectivity in history as impossible, Bevir asserts the contrary, at least to a degree. 

Upholding the empiricist critique of the philosophers, Bevir rejects historical knowledge based upon facts obtained through pure experience, stating that, “because our experiences embody theoretical assumptions, our experiences cannot be pure.” (331)  However, he upholds the doctrine of historical objectivity through a process of comparison.  Distinguishing between facts and truth, a relatively subjective distinction in and of itself, Bevir believes that through comparison of accepted facts, and critique of opposing opinions, historians can objectively dissect historical events.  Key to Bevir’s theory is the processes of criticism, which he believes promotes progress. 

After providing the historical example of Locke’s Two Treatises and addressing potential criticisms, Bevir comes to the point in his argument that I believe is deeply flawed.  While I accept his conditional objectivity in recognizing that truth can never be purely understood because of personal experience and his method of comparative objectivity, its validation is a different matter.  According to Bevir, humanity’s continued existence is evidence that “our perceptions are generally reliable.”  From here he justifies his argument by asserting that “we can ground interpretations in facts, facts in perceptions, and perceptions in our ability to interact successfully with our environment.” (341)  I agree with the first two statements in terms of historical pursuit, but I do not believe that the continued existence of humankind provides any evidence of accurate perceptions with regard to the academic study of history.

Finally, both Novick and Bevir emphasize the importance of objectivity in history.  Without it, there can be no profession dedicated to its pure pursuit.  While we can never completely escape our personal and cultural biases, Bevir’s method of comparison governed by critique is a worthy substitute, albeit inherently subjective.  Indeed, it is quite a paradox; the impossibility and simultaneously the necessity of historical objectivity. 

Capitalism as Ordained by God

In The Origin of Capitalism Ellen Meiksins Wood seeks to examine the development of the historically specific phenomenon of capitalism.  In her work, Wood aggressively confronts the common belief, especially in the Western World, that there is no alternative to capitalism and that indeed it is the natural course of humankind. 

Wood begins her assessment by outlining the various theories by which scholars have previously sought to explain capitalism’s origins and systematically illustrating the inherent flaws in each.  The most common of these explanations, the commercialization model, holds that capitalism is simply the natural outcome of human practice and that its emergence was inevitable, only requiring the removal of certain constraining obstacles.  Similar to Postone, Wood critiques the commercialization model and those that follow the same logic on the basis of their failure to comprehend the origin of capitalism as a historically specific event.  Progressing to the Marxist philosophies, Wood highlights the movement toward a historically determinant understanding of capitalism’s development, and in so doing, sets the stage for her historically specific explanation.

Departing from the traditional association of capitalism with urban centers and the bourgeois, Wood believes that capitalism emerged out of the post-feudal, agrarian English countryside.  It was here, argues Wood, that the market became the great social mediator.  Furthermore, in contrast to the Absolutism present in France, which afforded opportunity, the market in England resulted in compulsion, the mark of a capitalist economy.

English agrarian capitalism led to English industrial capitalism, and eventually capitalist imperialism.  From capitalist imperialism, the nation state emerged.  In this sense, for Wood, the development of the modern international capitalist economy can be traced back to the fields of sixteenth-century England.

Contrastly, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism seeks to explain not the specific historical origin of capitalism, but as its title would suggest, the spirit behind the system.  Beginning by noting the propensity for wealthy cities to embrace Protestantism during the sixteenth-century and the high rate of Protestants at or near the top of the socio-economic strata of such cities, Weber introduces his theory that the ascetic doctrines of Calvinist Protestantism coincide with the commercial aims of capitalism. 

For Weber, the basis of Calvin’s theology, the doctrine of predestination, is the fundamental element driving the relationship between the Protestant faith and capitalist development.  Inherent within this doctrine is the concept of the elect, those preordained for salvation by God.  Additionally, the belief in one’s calling is also deeply ingrained within the Protestant tradition.  Believing that the purpose of humanity on the earth is to glorify God, and that the only way to glorify God is through fulfillment of one’s calling, the Protestant ethic essentially endorses the labor exploitation of industrial capitalism.   Therefore, within the Protestant faith, there is a contradicting duality.  On the one hand, if one is a working class laborer, that is one’s calling and should therefore be embraced in order to glorify the Almighty.  On the other hand, however, if one is an industrial capitalist accumulating vast amounts of wealth at the expense of others, this too is one’s calling and furthermore is evidence of election.

While Wood and Weber, seek to explain separate elements of capitalism, there is one distinct similarity between the two.  In both accounts, the pervasive belief in capitalism’s heavenly ordination justifies its exploitation of humanity and creation.  The Origin of Capitalism highlights this through the concept of improvement and waste.  In justifying the use of land as ordained by God, the English conquered the Irish and later their colonists used the same doctrines to justify the conquering of Native Americans.  Clearly, religious faith is present throughout Weber’s work and in fact is the basis behind the spirit which drives capitalist development and perpetuation.  It never ceases to amaze me how Christianity has historically been contorted and interpreted to the benefit of one while simultaneously used to dominate and exploit another.

 

A Reinterpretation, Not a Rejection

I must confess that despite Moishe Postone’s subtitle, A Reinterpretation of Marx’s Critical Theory in his work, Time, Labor, and Social Domination, my initial impression led me to expect the book to culminate with an unequivocal rejection of Marx’s mature critical theory as historically determinant and thereby, transhistorically invalid.  Ultimately, however, it is the historical specificity of Marx’s theory that Postone argues is the source of its power.  Thus, far from rejecting it on these grounds, Postone embraces Marx and attempts to reinterpret his thought by distinguishing between Marx’s mature critical theory and traditional Marxism, the latter of which he argues has become anachronistic within the framework of post-liberal capitalism.

At the heart of this reinterpretation is the distinction between understanding Marxist theory as a critique of capitalism from the standpoint of labor, and understanding it as a critique of labor within capitalism.  Postone argues that the latter defines Marx’s mature critique and is therefore the framework within which we must view it.  This distinction is extremely critical to both a comprehension of Marxist theory and an adequate understanding of its reinterpretation by Postone. 

Postone argues that it is an understanding of Marx as a critique of capitalism from the standpoint of labor that defines traditional Marxist thought, thereby rendering it anachronistic and inapplicable outside of nineteenth-century industrial capitalism.  As such, Marx’s theory becomes useless in the pursuit of explaining socio-economic and political issues pertaining to post-liberal capitalist society.  Moreover, it is unable to assist in Marx’s ultimate objective, social emancipation from the alienating forces of capitalism. 

The source of emancipation, within the theoretical framework of traditional Marxism, is the abolition of private property.  Within the past century, a variety of Communist revolutions have arisen, predicated upon this ideal.  These revolutions created what Postone refers to as “actually existing socialism.”  Because of their traditional interpretation of Marx, thus their failure to focus on the historically specific concept of labor within capitalism, these societies effectively perpetuated the same system of social domination inherent in industrial capitalism.  In other words, they merely replaced the industrial capitalist with the state.  In rejecting these and other societies of “state capitalism,” Postone argues that the abolition of private property and the market have not, and will not, constitute emancipation.  Rather, if freedom is to be achieved, a complete reformulation of labor must take place.  In short, the working class must become ”collective commodity owners,” their labor being the individual commodities they possess and the society’s labor power being the collective commodity. (Postone 389)  Only when the fundamental formulation of the labor system is radically altered, constituted by the working class claiming their labor as their commodity, can the exploitative elements of capitalism be overcome.

Finally, Moishe Postone, perhaps in the spirit of the theoretical nature of his subject, does not provide a concrete description of how such a “labor revolution” could come to pass.  Instead, he affirms the foundations of Marx’s mature critique as historically determinant and thereby providing a point of departure for works such as his own.  Furthermore, Postone views his own work in the same light, providing a point of departure for further exploration of modern society and ultimately, the possibility of social emancipation from the alienating forces of capitalism. 

 

A Justifying Example

In reading a variety of selections from Karl Marx, it becomes clear that nearly a century later, E.P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working Class stands as, if nothing else, a detailed account of the manifestation of Marxist theory.  In his explanation of the transformation of English society from 1790 to 1820 as a function of the rise of industrialism and the subsequent formation of the English working class, Thompson provides a cornerstone example of the capitalist exploitation of the working people as explained by Marx. 

While Marx explains the history of the world through the lense of labor, that is as a process of material production, Thompson focuses on the specific impacts of capitalist exploitation in England during the Industrial Revolution.  I particularly appreciate Thompson’s clarification of the term class as opposed to classes and his assertion that class is not a thing, a structure, or a category, but rather an historical phenomenon explained through human relationship.  In Chapter Six, Thompson details the exploitation of the industrial working population at the hands of the capitalists.  Of particular interest is the role of the Methodist Church in maintaining the status-quo through its strict adherence to discipline and pronouncements of the virtues of poverty.  Thompson describes exactly what Marx declares, “Big industry makes for the worker not only the relation to the capitalist but labour itself unbearable.” (The German Ideology: Marx-Engels Reader; 186) 

The connection between Marxist thought and Thompson’s research is readily apparent throughout the work, however I was particularly struck by Thompson’s description of English working class as being, “subjected simultaneously to an intensification of two intolerable forms of relationship: those of economic exploitation and political oppression.”(198-199)  Clearly not coincidentally, these are precisely the ingredients Marx declares will inevitably lead to a Communist revolution.  While not fully developing in England, due largely to the role of legislative regulation, Marx’s predictions held true less than a century later in varying degrees from Latin America to Asia. 

Epitomizing the Values of the Guild

In this, my inaugural blog post, I will seek to accurately convey my new-found admiration for Leopold Von Ranke.  Hitherto relatively unfamiliar with his work, I am immensely impressed by his understanding of the value and function of history as it relates to other disciplines, namely political science.  I am further impressed by his commitment to document-based research methods and his apparent introduction of the perusal of primary source material as the life-blood of historical research.  But in light of my recent study regarding the common values of the professional historian, I am struck by Von Ranke’s natural adherence to these principles.  Furthermore, while Von Ranke does not break from Kant and Hegel on the importance of reason and rational thought as a continual process ultimately defining human nature, his refusal to accept the abstract without the particular is admirable indeed.  New to the process of training to become a professional historian, it is quite encouraging to read a true embodiment of the values of the guild.